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Abstract. We study three dierent exchange rate regimes in a stochastic OLG model with free capital
mobility and incomplete markets. The regimes are characterized by the type of coordinated seignorage
nanced transfer (or scal) policy in place. We are especially interested in how the dierent types of
policies aect the possibility of sunspot equilibria with real and/or nominal eects. The rst type of
policy considered, where both governments are inactive does not lead to a Pareto optimal allocation
(in the long run) and there is a continuum of equilibria as well as sunspot equilibria. The second type
of policies are devaluation policies, where the country adversely aected by a shock devaluates. For
most of these policies sunspots may have real aects, giving rise to suboptimal equilibria. If a central
bank unilaterally tries to defend the exchange rate in order to avoid these sunspot equilibria, it may or
may not, depending on its reserves, experience a currency crisis which forces it to give up intervention.
Finally, we consider a type of policies that allow the exchange rate to be constant. For these policies
sunspots cannot have real eects and all equilibria are Pareto optimal, but may aect the exchange rate.
Coordinated intervention by both central banks rules out all nominal sunspot equilibria, but unilateral
intervention does not. A nal option, a monetary union also leads to a Pareto optimal allocation if the
two countries agree on transfers to the country adversely hit by a shock, i.e. agree on a coordinated
scal policy.
JEL classication number: D52, D60, D84, F31, F42
Key words: currency crisis, exchange rate policies, monetary union, OLG model, perfect currency
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1 Introduction
The foreign exchange markets seem to have a certain dichotomy to them, which makes it dicult to
capture all their essential feature in one single model. On the one hand, fundamental economic activity
arguably drives the exchange rate in the long run, while on the other hand, in the short run, the exchange
rates seem to be highly sensitive to speculative forces and sentiments in the market. The dual nature of
this market can also be exposed by pointing to the dual nature of the currencies being traded. On the
one hand, each currency has a specic role in its country, being used as a primary means of payments,
and does as such have an intrinsic not easily substitutable role1. On the other hand, the currencies
do not, when traded on the international nancial markets, have any intrinsic value and when there is
free capital mobility currencies are close substitutes2; demand is only driven by their return structure.
Many models, dealing with the markets for foreign exchange, emphasize the rst aspect for instance by
assuming a cash in advance constraint on what trade can take place in what currency or utility of the
local currency only, i.e. assume no substitutability at all (see for instance Devereux and Engel, 2000
and Obstfeld and Rogo,2000). In the model presented here another tradition is followed according
to which currencies are perfect substitutes. We use a variant of an OLG model rst introduced by
Kareken and Wallace(1981). In this model agents care only about the return structure of the currencies
and this makes the exchange rate sensitive to expectations. As such the model might be useful as
a tool for thinking about the consequences of dierent exchange rate regimes for the "expectational
stability" of the economy. One advantage of using the OLG structure for stochastic economies model
is that it is tractable even when agents are heterogeneous. This is in contrast with the innite horizon
structure often being used. As it turns out, ex-ante heterogeneity among agents (countries) will be
important for the existence of sunspot equilibria in the model studied here and may lead to ex-post
heterogeneity too. We assume that markets are incomplete. Because the exchange rate may potentially
be used to reallocate between countries hit by dierent shocks, i.e. provide insurance ( an idea similar to
many current studies among those Devereux and Engel, 2000 and Obstfeld and Rogo, 2000) the choice
between dierent exchange rate regimes is less trivial than in, for instance, the extension of Kareken
and Wallace by Manuelli and Peck(1990), in some aspects the predecessor to the model studied here.
Three dierent scal policies/exchange rate regimes, as well as a monetary union, are then considered
to see to what degree they may make up for the incompleteness being stipulated. The three regimes are
refered to as respectively free oat with non-intervention, oating exchange rates with devaluations, and
policies set to x the exchange rate. These regimes are studied mainly because, as their labels indicate,
they have some resemblance to regimes that we actually do observe. Also, it is quite natural to study
the rst regime, to see if active governments are necessary for eciency. The two other regimes also
have the appealing feature that they lead to the symmetric Pareto optimal allocation, at least in the
absence of sunspot inuence.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Under a free oat there is a continuum of equilibria
for none of which the symmetric Pareto optimal allocation is achieved for more than a limited time.
Furthermore, under this regime sunspots may have real eects (sunspot equilibria may dominate some
non-sunspot equilibria and may be dominated by other non-sunspot equilibria)3. We next study a class
of oating exchange rate regimes with devaluations. For all of them it is the case that sunspots may
matter. The eect of these sunspots is real except for a single member of the said class. This single
1Absence of perfect currency substitutability can be phrased as follows: If the two currencies A and B happen to have
the same return structure then a person in country A will strictly prefer currency A over currency B.
2McKinnon(1994) provides a criticism of models with perfect currency substitutability.
3The study of the (real) eects of sunspots originates with Cass and Shell(1983).
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policy is characterized by leaving the agents ex-ante symmetric. With equal investment opportunities
they will also be ex-post symmetric (as is the case in the model of Manuelli and Peck,1990) which, in
turn, means that sunspots cannot aect the allocation of commodities. We also study the role of central
bank intervention for these types of policies. If the two central banks coordinate, the exchange rate
can be kept at the right levels for the policies to work as intended, but a single central bank may not
be able to defend the exchange rate in the long run and currency crises may appear. Similar results
are found for an exchange rate regime with devaluation, where the monetary policy of one ountry is
passive, while that of the other country is active. Finally, when the policy is set to x the exchange
there may also be multible equilibria, but these only have nominal eects, aecting the exchange rate,
but leaving consumption untouched at the symmetrical Pareto optimal allocation. The analysis thus
shows that when there are two currencies the currency regimes can be chosen to "complete" otherwise
incomplete markets. If the two countries form a monetary union direct subsidies have to replace the
former arrangement. A monetary union removes endogenously created expectational instability but if
the two countries are unable to create, in another way, the necessary insurance against country specic
shocks, the cost of this expectational stability may be too high.
In studying the existence of sunspot equilibria under devaluation policies we rely on Chiappori,Geoard,
and R. Guesnerie (1992) who provide a very general link between indeterminacy and the existence of
local sunspot equilibria. Some technical aspects of our results may be of independent interest. The
indeterminacy exposed under the devaluation policy is dierent from what is ordinarily found in OLG
models (or in nite horizon incomplete markets models); it is present due to the fact that the two
currencies are subject to an ination tax. Also, we show that when both governments are passive, only
for sunspots that are correlated with fundamentals can sunspot equilibria exist. Finally, we provide
examples of sunspots equilibria where, when the sunspots are correlated with fundamentals, the quali-
tative features of the equilibrium diers from the case where the process of sunspots is independent of
the process of fundamentals.
The analysis that is probably most closely related to ours is found in King, Wallace, and Weber(1992)
(KWW). Here an intermediate case between complete lack of and full substitutability of currencies is
modeled by assuming that some traders have a cash in advance constraint in only one currency while
others have it in any of the two currencies. Like in the present study, the main concern is with the
inuence of indeterminacy on welfare, however in their model there is no fundamental uncertainty and
thus no "fundamental" need for insurance. Briey put, the conclusion of KWW is that when markets
are complete (i.e. agents can insure against sunspot related shocks) the choice between oating and
xed exchange rates is immaterial, while when markets are incomplete, inecient sunspot equilibria
may be present under oating exchange rates. The fact that the this kind of expectational instability
may be present, even though only some agents ("a speculative fringe" in the words of KWW) regard
the currencies as perfect substitutes lends some support to our concentrating on the case of perfect
substitutability. The present study diers in at least two fundamental ways. Here, an exchange rate
regime is to be chosen both with an eye to how it makes up for the incompleteness of markets and
how vulnerable it is to expectational instability. Furthermore, the role of central bank intervention
and the possibility and nature of currency crises is being studied. Other models have studied the issue
of expectational stability without assuming perfect substitutability. In fact, the elaborate model of
Woodford(1991) aims exactly at studying how increased substitutability may decrease the expectational
stability of the economy4. Neumeier (1998) provides a general equilibrium study of the trade-o between
a monetary union and multiple currencies in a nite horizon incomplete markets setting with cash in
4See also Weil(1991) for a simpler analysis along the same lines.
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advance constraints. It is argued that a monetary union may be regarded as a commitment to reduce
"non-fundamental" uncertainty injected into the system via the monetary policies of the dierent central
banks. But a monetary union also reduces the span of the assets available, since there will no longer
be bonds denominated in dierent currencies which can react dierently to idiosyncratic fundamental
shocks in dierent countries. This trade-o is then studied. The possible selullling nature of currency
crises is studied in, among others, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo(2000) and Obstfeld(1996), both
which are concerned with small open economies. In these studies, like in the one presented here, it
is found that for some fundamentals (policy variables) there may be a positive probability both of
a crisis and of no crisis while for others there is zero probability of a crisis. Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo(2000) emphasize the potential destabilizing eects of the nancial sector caused by the
governments' guarantees to bail out domestic banks. Such an arrangement, it is argued, may make the
occurence of a currency crisis 'more likely' if the bailout is nanced by seignorage. Thus like in the
present study, the use of seignorage may create the instability that makes sunspots possible.
2 The model and equilibrium
The model5 has two countries, A and B, each with an overlapping generation structure of representative
agents. Thus at each date, t, the are in each country two agents, one old and one young. Since agents
only consume when they are old, we can without confusion use the labels A and B for residents in
countries A and B respectively. Whenever we in the following introduce stochastic variables these are
supposed to be dened on some underlying probabilty space (
;S; ). Also, distributions of stochastic
variables are denoted by P . When agents take expectations they use this probability space, their
(perfect) knowledge about the stochastic variables dened on it, and all information available up to and
including the current date; we write Et to emphasize the latter assumption. Thus in equilibrium agents
have rational expectations. The endowment structure is as follows. When young, an agent in any of the
two countries receives the amount e of the single commodity. When old, he receives a positive random
amount of the same commodity; at date t, eBt and eBt for the two countries A and B respectively.
We assume that the processes feAtgt and feBtgt are i.i.d. and mutually independent and also that:
e > jeAt   eBtj a.s. . This last assumption allows for full risk sharing to take place under the exchange
regimes with active government policies.
Agents only receive utility of consumption, Cct; c = A;B when they are old
6, this utility being u(Cc)
in both countries, where u is dened on <+, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and C
2. The agents of
this economy want to transfer their initial real wealth, e, to the last period of their lifes. Since there are
no restrictions on capital mobility in this model, this can be done by placing this wealth in a portfolio of
one or two currencies (named after their countries). No other assets are available and markets are then
incomplete (no short-selling can take place) although this incompleteness may not matter, depending
on the particular exchange rate regime and equilibrium. Since the two countries are facing idiosyncratic
risk but are ex-ante symmetric, it is of special interest to see, which institutional arrangements achieve
the symmetric Pareto optimal allocation where CAt = CBt = e+
1
a
2
(eAt + eBt)  C

t .
There is a government in each of the two countries, which each can issue its currency in negative or
positive amounts and make transfers to or tax their own citizens (in fact the current old). If we denote
the real transfer/tax in country c = A;B at date t by Sct and the outstanding money at the beginning
of period t by Mct we then have the budget constraint of the government: Mct = Sctpct where pct
5The model and the polices dened below are taken from Nielsen(1998).
6Note that an immediate consequence of this assumptions on agents' preferences is that sunspots of the type studied in
Azariadis(1981) - sunspots that amount to random redistributions between young and old - will never be present.
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is the price of the commodity in terms of currency c and Mct = Mct+1  Mct. Since governments'
outlays are nanced by seignorage the choice of SA and SB gives rise to particular exchange rate regimes,
to be described below. When considering a particular exchange regime and its associated (stationary)
equilibrium we could think of the horizon of the economy as stretching from  1 to +1. Under another
interpretation the horizon is from 1 to +1 and in that case we have to specify what happens to the
initial old under a specic new regime. This in turn depends on what kind of institution was in place
before the regime started. Were the two economies for instance monetarized, but in autarky, or was
there already some interaction between the two economies? We choose not to be too specic on this
matter. It is here worth stressing one more time that this model is not concerned with the distribution
between generations; In any reasonable equilibrium the current old will in each period consume all
available commodities. The issue is rather insurance, the distribution of risk across agents in the same
generation. Thus the scope for trade is not in physically dierentiated commodities but in assets that
deliver the commodity in specic states. This is clearly a very crude proxy for observed economic
activity between countries. But it does allow us to capture the nancial aspect of the markets for
foreign exchange that we wish to emphasize while at the same time providing the model with a solid
foundation for welfare analysis. At the bottomline then, at date 1 there is available for consumption
by the old the stochastic quantity 2e + eA1 + eB1 of the commodity. We assume that this quantity is
divided between the initially old in such a way that they are not worse o, than they would have been
if the unspecied original institution would not have been displaced. With these remarks about the
model in place, an equilibrium where both currencies are in circulation can be dened.
We let
a
MA and
a
MB denote the initial aggregate money holdings of the old of currencies A and B,
respectively.
Denition 1: Equilibrium
A stochastic sequence fAt; Bt; CAt; CBt; SAt; SBt;MAt;MBt; pAt; pBtg
1
t=1 2 (<
4
+<
2
<
4
++)
1 s.t. for
all t, a.s. we have
(i) Mc1 =
a
M c1; c = A;B
(ii) ct solves the problem:
Maxq2[0;1]Etu

q
pAt
a
pAt+1
+ (1  q)
pBt
a
pBt+1

e+ ect+1 + Sct+1

; c = A;B (1)
(iii) (At + Bt)pAte = MAt + pAtSAt
(2  At   Bt)pBte = MBt + pBtSBt
MAt
a
pAt
+ SAt + eAt +
MBt
a
pBt
+ SBt + eBt = 2e+ eAt + eBt
(iv) Mct+1 = Mct + pctSat; c = A;B
and furthermore,
(v) Cc1 =
a
M
a
pc1
+ Sc1 + ec1; c = A;B
Cct+1 =

ct
pAt
a
pAt+1
+ (1  ct)
pBt
a
pBt+1

e+ ect+1 + Sct+1; c = A;B; t  1 a
The requirement that Mct > 0; c = A;B means that both currencies are in demand. The second
condition states that both agents pick portfolios, in terms of fractions of real wealth invested, that
maximize their expected utility. The third requirement states that total demand for currency A and
B (on the left) is equal to total supply, namely what is sold by the old and what is sold (in negative
or positive quantities) by the government, and furthermore that total demand of the commodity (on
the left in the third equation) is equal to what is supplied. By Walras' law this third requirement is
redundant. Finally, (iv) provides a dynamical relation between the stocks of the two currencies in two
consecutive periods and (v) denes what consumption is in this equilibrium.
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Let us briey note that one equilibrium for this economy would give the same real outcome as autarky,
where each country is isolated from the other. If we let Sct  0 and pct =
a
Mc
a
e
;8t and Mct =
a
M c; 8t
then with At = 1; Bt = 0; and Cct = e + ect; 8t we have an equilibrium, where each country only
consumes its own endowments. This would also, for any (feasible) transfer process, be the case if there
were no free capital mobility. The outcome is clearly Pareto dominated by the consumption process
fC

t ; C

t g
1
t=1.
In order to study the equilibria arising from dierent policies it is convenient to formulate the
equilibrium conditions in terms of fewer variables. Using the equilibrium condition (At + Bt)pAte =
MAt + pAtSAt = MAt+1 we get that
pAt
a
pAt+1
=

MAt+1
a
(At + Bt)e

MAt+1
(At+1 + Bt+1)e  SAt+1

 1
=
(At+1 + Bt+1)e  SAt+1
a
(At + Bt)e
(2)
and similarly,
pBt
a
pBt+1
=
(2  At+1   Bt+1)e  Sbt+1
(2  At   Bt)e
(3)
In the following, for notational convenience, subscript t is sometimes not used, when the designation
of the period is irrelevant. Sometimes we will then use a prime on (portfolio) variables as in 
0
A
to
dierentiate between current (A) and future ones. Also, when we suppress reference to the period, C

refers not to the sequence, but to e+ 1a
2
(eA + eB). Now dene for any A; B s.t A + B 2 (0; 2), any
stochastic variables, 
0
A
; 
0
B
; SA, and SB, s.t. (
0
A
+ 
0
B
)e   SA > 0 and (2  
0
A
  
0
B
)e  SB > 0, a.s.,
and any information I7
Zc(A; B; 
0
A; 
0
B; SA; SB; I) = E
"
u
0
 
c
(
0
A
+ 
0
B
)e  SA
a
A + B
+ (1  c)
(2  
0
A
  
0
B
)e  SB
a
2  A   B
+ ec + Sc
!

 
(
0
A
+ 
0
B
)e  SA
a
A + B
 
(2  
0
A
  
0
B
)e  SB
a
2  A   B
!
jI
#
; c = A;B
Then consider the following denitions:
Denition 2: Temporary Equilibrium
(A; B; SA; SB; 
0
A
; 
0
B
; S
0
A
; S
0
B
) and information I s.t.
(i) c 2 [0; 1]; c = A;B; A + B 2 (0; 2); (A + B)e  SA > 0; (2  A   B)e  SB > 0
(ii) a.s. 
0
c 2 [0; 1]; c= A;B; 
0
A + 
0
B 2 (0; 2); (A0 + 
0
B)e  S
0
A > 0; (2  
0
A   
0
B)e  S
0
B > 0
(iii) Zc(A; B; 
0
A; 
0
B; S
0
A; S
0
B; I) = 0; c = A;B a.s. a
Denition 3: Equilibrium*
A stochastic sequence fAt; Bt; SAt; SBtg
1
t=1 such that a.s.: 8t, with It = fAs; Bs; SAs; SBsg
t
s=1,
(At; Bt; SAt; SBt; At+1; Bt+1; SAt+1; SBt+1) and It form a temporary equilibriuma
It is then easy to see, that if we have an equilibrium* as dened in Denition 3 we also have an
equilibrium as dened in Denition 1. In period 1, set Mc1 =
a
M c; c = A;B. Then let pc1 be s.t.
MA1
a
pA1
= (A1+ B1)e SA1 and
MB1
a
pB1
= (2  A1  B1)e SB1. Finally, let MA2 = (A1+ B1)epA1 and
MB2 = (2  A1   B1)epB1. In any other period, t, MAt and MBt are given and given At, Bt, SAt,
and SBt, we can then dene pAt, pBt, MAt+1, and MBt+1 in the same manner as for the rst period.
7That is for any sub -algebra of S.
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3 Description and interpretation of the three main regimes
As earlier stated, the role of the governments' policy is to create options for insurance arrangements
between the agents of the two countries. This captures to some extent what we see in reality: Individual
agents cannot (in an ecient way) fully insure against country specic macroeconomic shocks. A
negative shock in one country may then, for instance, be met with an expansionary scal policy and
a devaluation, both measures to increase demand for domestic products and thus to increase domestic
income to compensate for the negative shock. To the extend that the income in the foreign country
decreases as a result of the revaluation of its currency, a transfer has, in eect, taken place.
We consider only coordinated policies8, that is the two countries agree to pursuing a certain policy
and stick to the rules stipulated by that policy9. Many policies result in the Pareto optimal allocation
C
 = fCt g. In particular, the governments could in principle agree to a redistribution, through taxes,
that independently of the portfolio holdings of the the current old would result in the consumption C.
Such a policy may have to depend not only on current and past shocks but also on current prices and
portfolio holdings, implying that the informational requirements are strong. We concentrate on policies
that arguably have some resemblance to observed policies, work through the "market", and for which
the transfers, SA and SB, only depend on current and past (macroeconomic) shocks.
We then concider two active policies or regimes and, in addition, the consequences of a policy of
no intervention. These policies are dened in terms of the taxes/subsidies, Sc; c = A;B, which by
the governments' budget constraints also dene their monetary policies10. The rst policy, Policy 1s
('s' for 'symmetric'), has a straight forward interpretation as a devaluation policy. The country, c,
that experiences a relatively negative shock, ect < maxfeAt; eBtg, issues money using the proceeds to
subsidize its own citizens, while the other country does not issue any money. As a result the currency of
country c devaluates and the agents that hold this currency, presumably both foreigners and residents,
pay a seignorage tax. The result will be a transfer from the foreign country to the home country, making
up for the relatively negative shock. This policy resembles what Obstefeld and Rogo(2000) call "an
optimal oat". Let et = eBt   eAt.
Denition 4: Policy 1s
SAt = maxf0; eBt  eAtg = maxf0;etg
SBt = maxf0; eAt   eBtg = maxf0; etg
where  2 (1=2;1] a
The intention of this study is to focus on policies that can be interpreted as having some observed coun-
terpart, and as being the outcome of an agreement between the two countries. We mostly concentrate on
symmetric policies, but one might argue that in some of the exchange rate arrangement observed there
is an implicitly agreed upon asymmetry. In such arrangements one country is "passive" (the phrase
"anchor" country has been used in some contexts) , while the other is "active" in pursuing a policy of
for instance devaluations or xing the exchange rate. In the context of the simple model being studied
here, such an asymmetric arrangement can, for the case of devaluations, be presented as follows:
8Obstfeld and Rogo(2000) also focus on coordinated policies.
9As in Canzoneri(1989) transfers between countries, here for insurance purposes, are broght about by seignorage which
hits both residents and foreigners. But while we assume cooperation between countries, Canzoneri assumes the opposite
which leads to suboptimal ination levels.
10In conjunction with these policies there may be further reallocations between the old in period 1 only. These realloca-
tions would be chosen to guarantee that noone is worse o in the new regime and are left unspecied.
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Denition 5: Policy 1a
SAt  0
SBt = (eAt   eBt) for suitably chosen  a
As we shall see, Policy 2 results, in the absence of sunspots, in a constant exchange rate. In eect this
policy designs a tightly coordinated monetary and scal policy in the two countries in order to keep
the money stock increasing at the same rate in the two countries. Also this policy has a counterpart in
Obstfeld and Rogo under the title "an optimal x".
Denition 6: Policy 2
SAt =
q
a
2(q 1)
(eBt   eAt) =
q
a
2(q 1)
et
SBt =
2 q
a
2(q 1)
(eBt   eAt) =
2 q
a
2(q 1)
et
where q 2 (0; 1 
sup(eA eB)
a
2e
] [ [1 +
sup(eA eB)
a
2e
; 2) a
The assumption made earlier, guarantees that the two intervals above are non-empty. In a companion
paper (Nielsen,1998) it is shown that Policy 2 is the only policy (chosen from a set of policies depending
on current real shocks and past information) that results in the allocation C when agents have rational
beliefs (as dened in Kurz, 1994). This is one reason to study this policy. Another is that it leads to
the exchange rate, xt =
pAt
a
pBt
, being constant while achieving the allocation C. However it is not the
only such policy. Notice that when the exchange rate is constant, i.e. xt 1 = xt we have RAt 
pAt 1
a
pAt
=
pBt 1
a
pBt
 RBt, in other words the gross return on both currencies are the same. Suppose then that we
have a particular equilibrium, where CAt = CBt = C

t ; 8t and xt = xt+1; 8t. Using ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) we
would have
ct
t+1e   SAt+1
a
t
+ (1  ct)
(2  t+1)e  SBt+1
a
2  t
+ ect+1 + Sct+1 = C

t+1; c = A;B (4)
t+1e   SAt+1
a
t
=
(2  t+1)e  SBt+1
a
2  t
(5)
where t  At + Bt. Combining ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) we get
eAt + SAt = eBt + SBt (6)
Finally, using ( 6 ) in ( 5 ) we get
t+1 = t + (1  t)
SBt+1
a
2e
+ (2  t)
eBt+1   eAt+1
a
2e
(7)
Clearly, there may be (f.i. for e large enough) many policies, SA and SB and portfolio sequences ftg
that full ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) (which together with the requirement that CAt+1 +CBt+1 = 2C

t+1 imply ( 4 )
and ( 5 )) such that te > SAt; 8t and (2  t)e > SBt; 8t, i.e. such that the policies are feasible. Note
that these policies require that at any date, t + 1, individual agents pick exactly the portfolios that
make t+1 full ( 7 ) although, since both currencies have the same return, these individual agents are
indierent between all possible portfolios. Now, if we impose on the policy that t is a constant, = ,
this means that (1  )SBta
e
+ (2   ) eBt eAta
2e
= 0; 8t i.e. that SBt =
2 
a
2( 1)
(eBt   eAt) so that we have
Policy 2. Thus Policy 2 is in this sense the "simplest" constant exchange rate policy that results in the
Pareto optimal allocation C.
Note in passing, that any feasible policy SA and SB that fulls ( 6 ) leads to the allocation C

.
When ( 6 ) holds the two agents have the same budget sets and hence, by strict concavity of u, their
consumption will be identical: CAt = CBt; 8t. But, since in equilibrium CAt + CBt = 2C

t , the result
follows. In particular, for all policies that full ( 6 ) sunspots cannot have any real eects.
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4 The consequences of the three regimes and of a monetary union
In this section we ask the following questions for each of the three active/passive policies studied: (i) is
there an equilibrium that achieves C, (ii) are there equilibria in which sunspots play a role, and (iii)
if so, do sunspots have real eects. We will also consider the possibility and consequences of central
bank intervention. Finally, we dene what we mean by a monetary union for the model considered and
consider what will be the consequences of such an arrangement.
4.1 No Intervention
As a beginning, it is natural to ask about the consequences if the governments do not pursue an active
policy and in particular do not try to aect the movements of the exchange rate. Such a policy could in
the context of the model at present be interpreted as a free oat. Since the two governments keep the
money supply constant, the policy could also be interpreted as the counterpart to what Obstfeld and
Rogo(2000) call "world monetarism a la McKinnon". However, under that interpretation we would
expect that one or both central banks of the two countries would attempt to keep the exchange rate
xed. Let us at rst ignore that possibilty. The rst question then is, if the market can by itself establish
an equilibrium in the currency market that compensates for the absense of a preset complete market
structure.
When SAt = SBt = 0 we have
RAt+1 =
pAt
a
pAt+1
=
t+1
a
t
and RBt+1 =
pAt
a
pAt+1
=
2  t+1
a
2  t
(8)
where, recall, t = At + Bt. Thus for any  2 (0; 2) and any T  1, any ct; c = A;B, s.t. t =
; 8t  T , is an equilibrium of this economy from T and onwards since in that case the exchange rate
is constant implying that agents are indierent between all possible portfolios (there is no risk sharing
between agents).
C cannot be achieved
In the following we show that C cannot be achieved when governments are passive, but that for a
limited (stochastic) number of periods Ct is possible. If C

t is the consumption in some state and at
some t we have
[ct 1RAt + (1  ct)RBt]e+ ect = e+
1
a
2
(eAt + eBt); c = A;B
implying that
RBt =
e+ 1a
2
et
a
e(1  At 1)
 
At 1
a
1  At 1
RAt and RBt =
e  1a
2
et
a
e(1  Bt 1)
 
Bt 1
a
1  Bt 1
RAt
These two equations can only hold if At 1 is dierent from Bt 1. For that case, solving them gives
RAt = 1 +
1
a
2
2  At 1   Bt 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
= 1 +
1
a
2
2  t 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
(9)
RBt = 1 
1
a
2
At 1 + Bt 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
= 1 
1
a
2
t 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
(10)
Note that it then follows that RAt  RBt =
1
a
At 1 Bt 1
et
a
e
. So if the consumption, Ct , is achieved, we
have that
Et 1[u
0
(Ct )(RAt   RBt)] =
1
a
e(At 1   Bt 1)
Et 1[u
0
(e+
1
a
2
(eAt + eBt))(eBt   eAt)] = 0
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where the last equality follows from the fact that eBt and eAt are identically and independently dis-
tributed. In other words, at any date t   1, if the consumption is Ct on the following date, the rst
order conditions, (iii) of Denition 2, hold for the two agents.
Combining ( 8 ) with ( 9 ) and ( 10 ) we then have to check if there is a stochastic sequence fAt; Btg
s.t. a.s.,8t
At 6= Bt;
t
a
t 1
= 1 +
1
a
2
2  t 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
and
2  t
a
2  t 1
= 1 
1
a
2
t 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
and s.t. t 2 (0; 2); 8t. Each of these two equations is equivalent to
t = t 1 +
1
a
2
(2  t 1)t 1
At 1   Bt 1
et
a
e
 H(At 1; Bt 1;et) (11)
Note in passing that the stochastic relation described here is a martingale. So the question is, if there
is a stochastic sequence fAt; Btg with values in [0; 1]
2
s.t. ( 11 ) holds and t 2 (0; 2); 8t a.s. The
answer turns out to be negative. If t 1 2 (0; 2) and ct 1 2 [0; 1]; c = A;B, we have
At 1+Bt 1
a
jAt 1 Bt 1j
 1
and
2 At 1 Bt 1
a
jAt 1 Bt 1j
 1 in other words that
1
a
2
(2  t 1)t 1
jAt 1   Bt 1j
1
a
e

1
a
2e
; 8t; a.s. (12)
Suppose we were in an equilibrium where ( 11 ) held and t 2 (0; 2); 8t a.s. . In such an equilibrium
et and (At 1; Bt 1) would be independent. This implies that there is some k > 0 s.t. for all T > 1
there is for a.a. ! 2 
 some t0 s.t for t0 < t  t0 + T; eta
At 1 Bt 1
> k. Then choose T such that
Tk
a
2e
> 2. We then have for a t0 (depending on !) t0+T =t0 +
Pt0+T
t=t0+1
1
a
2
(2 t)t
At 1 Bt 1
et
a
e
 t0 +
Tk
a
2e
> 2,
a contradiction. We conclude that in the non-intervention regime, with probability 1, Ct cannot be
achieved indenitely.
Ct can be achieved for a random number of periods
However, there is an equilibrium that achieves Ct for a positive (random) number of periods. The
general principle is as follows. For any t   1, let t 1 be given. If there is some (At 1; Bt 1) with
At 1 + Bt 1 = t 1 and At 6= Bt s.t. H(At 1; Bt 1;et) 2 (0; 2) w. probability 1, let t be
determined by ( 11 ), and the consumption in next period will be the random variable Ct . Consequently,
with the gross returns on the two currencies dened by ( 9 ) and ( 10 ) the rst order conditions will hold
for the chosen (At 1; Bt 1), as was shown above. Else, if we cannot nd (At 1; Bt 1) with the desired
properties, let s = t 1; 8s  t. Then the exchange rate is constant and the two representative agents
are indierent between any portfolio holdings, especially some (At 1; Bt 1) s.t. At 1+Bt 1 = t 1.
The two countries will then consume the autarky allocation from period t and onwards.
An example will demonstrate the possibility of such an equilibrium. Start with 1 = 1 and let q be
close to but below 1. For any t, given t dene At and Bt as follows. If t  1 let At = qt and
Bt = (1  q)t. Else let 1  At = q(2  t) and 1  Bt = (1  q)(2  t). Thus
if t  1; t+1 = t +
2  t
a
2(2q   1)
et
a
e
and (13)
if t > 1; t+1 = t +
t
a
2(1  2q)
et
a
e
(14)
When t  1 we see that t+1 2 (0; 2). At the rst date t, at which with positive probability t+1 =2 (0; 2)
for the relevant of the two equations ( 13 ) and ( 14 ), let t+1 = t with probability one. In such an
9
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO nº 0102
equilibrium it may seem for a long time that the Pareto optimal allocation, C is achieved and thus
that the passive policy is achieving its goal. But eventually one of the currencies will be driven to near
extinction and after that the exchange rate markets can no longer provide the role of insurance needed
for Pareto optimality.
Sunspots
Clearly, there is a continuum of equilibria in the case of non-intervention and this should lead us to
suspect that sunspots may matter. A very simple type of sunspot equilibria can be dened based on the
equilibria just presented. Let ftg be a sequence of extrinsic stochastic variables taking values in f0; 1g.
Consider the example given above and modify the equilibrium as follows. For any given date, t and
given t dene the continuation as follows. If both t = 1 and t+1 2 (0; 2) with probability 1 (using
the relevant of the two equations ( 13 ) and ( 14 )) let t+1 be dened accordingly. Else let t+1 = t.
A variant of this sunspot equilibrium would freeze the two countries at autarky, i.e. at the constant
portfolio holding t the rst time where t = 0. Note, that the rst of these sunspot equilibria are not
Pareto dominated by the non-sunspot equilibrium it is derived from, since in the sunspot equilibrium,
generations far into the future may achieve perfect risk sharing, where they would be in autarky in the
non-sunspot equilibrium.
One may wonder if any other Pareto optimal allocations than C can be achieved under the non-
intervention regime. In the appendix we show that this is not the case. Also to be found in the appendix
is another example of a sunspot equilibrium. In this equilibrium, unlike in the one sketched above, with
probability 1 sunspots will matter at all dates, although their inuence will be diminishing. Finally,
observe that the sunspot equilibria exhibited are characterized by (the eects of) the sunspots being
correlated with fundamentals. We cannot have an equilibrium where sunspots have real eects and where
ftg is independent of fundamentals. In that case all agents would choose the same portfolios implying
that their real return would be e, i.e. we would have the autarky consumption, Cc = e + ec; c = A;B
for all sunspot states.
Remark: Central bank intervention
Suppose the purpose of the policy is to keep the exchange rate constant. Since sunspots may matter
under this policy there is then a need for central bank intervention. If the two central banks coordinate
they can keep the exchange rate at the desired level, but it will then only be the growth of world real
money supply that is kept at 0 and not that of the individual countries. One individual central bank
with limited reserves may not be able to keep the exchange rate constant, since when it is constant,
agents are indierent between all portfolios and currency crises may then appear in the same way as is
treated in more detail below.
CONCLUSION: NON-INTERVENTION
When there is no intervention by governments (or central banks), i.e. no active monetary or scal
policy, the returns on dierent currencies are entirely determined by demand conditions in the markets.
It has been demonstrated that it is possible to design a random process of demands that achieves perfect
risk sharing for a limited (random) time. However, in the long run such risk sharing is not achieved
without active policies by the two governments. Moreover, when the governments are passive there is
no guarantee that risk-sharing will be obtained even in the short run, since there is a continuum of
equilibria for many of which (like the one in the appendix or the autarky equilibrium) risk sharing is
less than perfect from date 1 onwards.
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4.2 Devaluations
4.2.1 Symmetric Policies
We consider rst a family of policies (SA; SB) = (Amaxf0; eB  eAg; Bmaxf0; eA  eBg) ( suppressing
reference to time) where
supe
a
e
> c > 0 and show that for the reduced family, where
A = B > 1=2 (15)
there is an equilibrium such that ct = c; 8t; c = A;B and the consumption is the Pareto optimal
allocation, C. Else, if ( 15 ) does not hold, there is no such equilibrium for policies within the family
considered. The interpretation of this family of policies is straigtforward. The government in country
c makes a transfer to its own citizens if the shock they experience is relatively adverse and nance
this transfer by issuing money. Since the other country does not issue money, this monetary expansion
makes country c's currency depreciate. If we are in an equilibrium and C is achieved, for constant t
we must have
E
"
u0(C)
 

0
e  Amaxf0; eB   eAg
a

 
(2  
0
)e  Bmaxf0; eA   eBg
2  
!#
= 0
This equality can only hold if
B
a
2 
=
A
a

, i.e. if B =
2 
a

A. Inserting this in the expression for the
equilibrium consumption of agent A, equalizing to C, and rearranging we get:
 AA
maxf0; eB   eAg

  (1  A)
2  
a

A
maxf0; eA   eBg
2  
+ Amaxf0; eB  eAg =
1
a
2
(eB   eA) (16)
If eA > eB (which happens with positive probability) this equality implies that
1 A
a

A = 1=2, while if
eA < eB it implies that (
 A
a

+ 1)A = 1=2. Both these equalities can only hold if  = 1 which in turn
implies A = B =  . It also follows that A =
A 1=2
a
A
(and consequently we require  > 1=2) and thus
B =
1
a
2B
. Since ( 16 ) now holds, CA = C

, and consequently CB = C

. The rst order conditions, (i)
of denition 2, hold and with  = 1 and  < supea
e
we have that also (ii) of the denition is fullled.
Hence the desired equilibrium is achieved. Note that when e is large relatively to supfeA   eBg,  may
be chosen to be very large implying that, in equilibrium, citizens of country c hold most of currency c
and that the reactions, in terms of SA and SB, are large.
Sunspot equilibria
So far we have only studied the (in terms of At and Bt) determinstic and stationary equilibria as-
sociated with the (reduced) family of devaluation policies. Below we show that (a) associated with
each member of this family there is a continuum of deterministic equilibria and a continuum of sta-
tionary Markov sunspot equilibria and (b) except when  = 1, the real part of these equilibria matters
(i.e. sunspots matter). In doing this we use the results of Chiappori, Geoard, and Guesnerie (1992),
henceforth CG&G. Therefore, consider the system Z = (ZA; ZB)
T
(T for transpose). We then have
Z(1  1a2 ;
1
a
2
; 1  1a
2
; 1a
2
) = (0; 0)T (where we now and below suppress reference to SA =  maxf0; eB eAg,
SB =  maxf0; eA eBg, and I). It is then straight forward to see that the technical Axiom A of CG&G
holds
11
. Assuming that @0Z is invertable, locally, the equilibrium is determined by
B =  (@0Z)
 1@1Z =
0
@ @Aa@0A @Aa@0B
@B
a
@
0
A
@B
a
@
0
B
1
A
a
11
This axiom states a relation between the derivatives of the deterministic and stochastic versions of the dynamical
system.
11
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO nº 0102
where @0Z is the Jacobean of Z with respect to the rst two variables, A and B and @1Z is the
Jacobean of Z with respect to the last two variables, 
0
A and 
0
B, both Jacobeans being evaluated in
(1  1a
2
; 1a
2
; 1  1a
2
; 1a
2
). Below we show:
(i) @0Z is actually invertible.
(ii) B has two real eigenvalues, one being 0 the other being > 1.
This means that the assumptions of CG&G's Theorem 3 holds, in particular Assumption(R). The
conclusion of this theorem is that for any suciently small neighbourhood, N of (1  1a
2
; 1a
2
; 1  1a
2
; 1a
2
)
and for any k > 2 there are k dierent points in N such that there is a stationary Markovian sunspot
equilibrium with support being these k points. Note that we also need N to be so small that (i) and
(ii) of Denition 2 holds.
Proving (i) and (ii)
Letting RA = e   maxf0; e
0
B   e
0
Ag , RB = e    maxf0; e
0
A   e
0
Bg; A = 1 
1
a
2
, and B =
1
a
2
we have
@0Z =
0
@ @Z^Aa@A + @Z^Aa@ @Z^Aa@
@Z^B
a
@
@Z^B
a
@B
+ @Z^Ba
@
1
A
Here, @Z^Aa
@A
= @Z^Ba
@B
= E[u00(C)(RA   RB]
2 while @Z^Aa
@
= E[u00(C)(RA  RB)( ARA + (1  A)RB)] 
E[u0(C)(RA +RB)] and
@Z^B
a
@
= E[u00(C)(RA  RB)( BRA + (1  B)RB)] E[u
0(C)(RA +RB) =
E[u00(C)(RA   RB)( (1  A)RA + ARB)]  E[u
0(C)(RA + RB)] - the last equality following from
the fact that A = 1  B .
It follows that the determinant, det @OZ =
@Z^A
a
@A
[@Z^Aa
@A
+ @Z^Ba
@
+ @Z^Aa
@
] =  @Z^Aa
@A
2E[u0(C)(RA+RB)] > 0.
So @0Z is invertible. Furthermore,
@1Z =
0
@ @ZAa@0A @ZAa@0B
@ZB
a
@
0
A
@ZB
a
@
0
B
1
A = @ZAa
@
0
A
E
where E is the matrix with 1 in all positions. The equality follows since @Zca
@
0
k
is the same for c = A;B; k =
A;B (and equal to E[u00(C)(RA  RB)(2A   1)] + Eu
0(C)2e = Eu0(C)2e). Consequently,
B =  
@ZA
a
@
0
A
a
det@0Z
0
BB@
@Z^A
a
@A
+ @Z^Ba
@
 
@Z^A
a
@
@Z^A
a
@A
+ @Z^Aa
@
 
@Z^B
a
@
@Z^A
a
@A
 
@Z^B
a
@
+ @Z^Aa
@
@Z^A
a
@A
 
@Z^B
a
@
+ @Z^Aa
@
1
CCA
Since this matrix is singular, one eigenvalue is 0. The other is traceB which is
 2
@ZA
a
@
0
A
a
det@0Z
@Z^A
a
@A
=
E[u0(C)]2e
a
E[u0(C)(RA + RB)]
=
E[u0(C)]2e
E[u0(C)(2e   maxfe
0
B   e
0
A; e
0
A   e
0
Bg)]
> 1
This concludes the proofs of the two claims, (i) and (ii).
Why do we have sunspots inuence in this model?
Agents are forced to invest in one of the two currencies even though, due to seignorage, the expected
gross return on them, is less than one in the stationary equilibrium. This gives rise to an instability.
Let us show this formally. Agent c solves the problem:
max
q
E
(
u
"
q

0
e  SA
a

+ (1  q)
(2  
0
)e  SB
a
2  
+ e
0
c + Sc
#)
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with solution ^c(; 
0
). We also let ^^c() = ^c(; ) and study this function further. If the current
aggregate holding, , is equal to the future aggregate holding, 
0
, the rst order conditions for agent A
reduce to
F (; A)  E

u0

e  A
 maxf0; eB   eAg

  (1  A)
 maxf0; eA   eBg
2  
+ eA +  maxf0; eB   eAg


 maxf0; eB   eAg

 
 maxf0; eA   eBg
2  

= 0
-the expectation is w.r.t. the stochastic variables, ec; Sc; c = A;B. We dierentiate A implicitly w.r.t.
 and evaluate in (1; 1  1a
2
).
@F
a
@
= (1 
1
a
2
)2E
h
u00(C)[(maxf0; eA   eBg)
2
  (maxf0; eB   eAg)
2]
i
 
2E

u00(C)[maxf0; eA   eBg  maxf0; eB   eAg] maxf0; eA   eBg

+
E

u0(C)[maxf0; eA   eBg+maxf0; eB   eAg]

The rst element of this sum is equal to 0, the last is > 0 and the second is equal to
 2E

u00(C)[eA   eB] maxf0; eA   eBg

> 0
Consequently, @
^^A
a
@
=
 2E [u00(C)[eA   eB] maxf0; eA   eBg] + E [u
0(C)[maxf0; eA   eBg+maxf0; eB   eAg]]
 2E [u00(C)[eA   eB]2]
We have (eA eB)
2 = (eA eB)[maxf0; eA eBg maxf0; eB eAg] and thus by symmetry and indepen-
dence of the distributions of eA and eB thatE[u
00(C)(eA eB)
2] = 2E[u00(C)(eA eB)maxf0; eA eBg].
In conclusion, @
^^A
a
@
> 1=2 and since @
^^A
a
@
= @
^^B
a
@
it follows that @
^^A
a
@
+ @
^^B
a
@
> 1. In other words, when
 and 
0
increase with the same amount (starting from 1 in the stationary deterministic equilibrium)
then A + B increases more. By continuity this continues to hold in some neighborhood N^ of 1 and
this is, in the end, what makes the deterministic stationary equilibrium indeterminate.
The indeterminacy described in two dimensions
Notice that @Aa
@
0
A
+ @Ba
@
0
A
= traceB > 1. Since in the temporary equilibrium, it is only the 
0
= 
0
A+
0
B
that matters this shows the following, which we refer to as "two dimensional indeterminacy":
9
a
;
a
 with 
a
< 1 <
a
 such that 8 2 (
a
;
a
); 9! 
0
 H() and (A; B; 
0
A; 
0
B) with j
0
  1j
 j   1j; A + B = ; and 
0
A + 
0
B = 
0
such that(A; B; 
0
A; 
0
B) form a temporary equilibrium
What is proved in CG&G is essentially that this indeterminacy implies the existence of stationary local
sunspot equilibria.
Revaluation policy
The two countries may also decide for a revaluation policy, according to which the country that
experiences a relatively favourable shock revaluates, i.e its goverment buys money and levys a tax on its
citizens. The policy would have the following form: SA =   maxf0; eA eBg, SB =   maxf0; eB eAg
and, with A = 1 
1
a
2
and B =
1
a
2
, C is achieved. With this policy we do not observe said instability,
i.e. the equilibrium is (locally) determinate. This policy does not seem to have a real counterpart.
Furthermore, in the companion paper, Nielsen(1998) it is shown that this policy will not lead to the ex-
post optimal allocation C when agents have (generic) rational beliefs, instead of rational expectations.
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The eects of sunspots
When  = 1, eA + SA = eA +maxf0; eB   eAg = eB +maxf0; eA   eBg = eB + SB, i.e. ( 6 ) holds and
as was noted before sunspots cannot have any real eects. For any other  the sunspot will have real
eects. To see this write out the consumption at date t + 1 of agent A as a function of the aggregate
portfolio holdings:
CAt+1 =

At
t+1
a
t
+ (1  At)
2  t+1)
a
2  t

e + (1 
At
a
t
)SAt+1  
1  At
a
2  t
SBt+1 + eAt+1
Suppose that it were the case that for all t and all states, (At; Bt) that given that state, t+1 were
non-random. Consider then a t and a state (At; Bt) s.t. given that state (At+1; Bt+1) is random,
taking each of the two values (1A; 
1
B) and (
2
A; 
2
B) dierent from each other, with positive probability.
By assumption then
1A + 
1
B = 
2
A + 
2
B = t+1 (17)
Furthermore, there would be states 3 and 4 s.t. P (t+2 = 
j+1
j(At+1; Bt+1) = (
j
A; 
j
B)) = 1; j =
1; 2. Suppose without loss of generality that 3  4. This together with ( 17 ) would mean that
^c(
1
A + 
1
B ; 
3)  ^c(
2
A + 
2
B ; 
4) (because @^ca
@
0 > 0) i.e. that 1c  
2
c ; c = A;B implying, in turn
because of ( 17 ), that (1A; 
1
B) = (
2
A; 
2
B), a contradiction. In conclusion, in a sunspot equilibrium, at
some dates t t+1 has to be random conditional on date t information.
Then consider a date, t and a state, (At; Bt) s.t. given that state, t+1 is truely random. If it were
the case that CAt+1 were not eected by t+1 this would, since ftg is independent of feAt; eBtg, mean
that Ata
t+1
= 1 Ata
2 t
which is equivalent to
At =
t
a
2
(18)
If ( 18 ) holds (which it does when  = 1) 1a
2
 maxf0; eBt eAtg 
1
a
2
 maxf0; eAt eBtg+eAt is not equal
to 1a
2
(eAt + eBt) (unless  = 1) with probability 1 and thus C

t is not achieved. The conclusion is that,
locally, sunspots do matter.
Example of sunspot equilibrium
We provide an example of how to construct sunspot equilibria for the case  = 112. When  = 1, in
any equilibrium, At = Bt and CAt = CBt = C

t . Suppose then that there are two sunspots, 1 and 2
with transition matrix  
P11 P12
P21 P22
!
to be determined. In equilibrium, letting i be the aggregate portfolio associated with sunspot i,
E
"
2X
i=1
u0(C)
 
ie  SA
a
j
 
(2  i)e  SB
a
2  j
!
Pji
#
= 0; j = 1; 2
Letting X = E[u0(C)SA] = E[u
0(C)SB] > 0 and Y = E[u
0(C)e] > X this equality can be written as
X
"
1
a
2  j
 
1
a
j
#
+ Y
2X
i=1
"
i
a
j
 
2  i
a
2  j
#
Pij = 0
If dierent from 0, we can divide through by ( 1a
2 j
 
1
a
j
) to get
X + Y
P
2
i=1 iPji   j
a
j   1
= 0
a
12This example is taken from Nielsen(1998).
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Letting q 2 (0; 1) be the solution to X   Y q = 0 we then require that
Pj11 + Pj22 = j + (1  j)q; j = 1; 2 (19)
If we pick 1 < 1 < 2 s.t. (ii) of Denition 2 holds for 1 and 2, then since, for j = 1; 2, 1 <
j+(1 j)q = q+(1  q)j < 2 we can nd a Markov matrix s.t. ( 19 ) holds. The result is a sunspot
equilibrium where, as in Manuelli and Peck (1990), the sunspots have an inuence on the exchange rate,
but not on the real part of the economy, i.e. consumption. Note, that in contrast to Manuelli and Peck
the sunspot equilibria considered here are stationary.
Central bank intervention
To avoid the type of sunspot equilibria described, the central banks of the two countries may consider to
intervene on the markets to keep the exchange rate at the level found in the stationary Pareto optimal
equilibrium without extrinsic uncertainty. Let us call this equilibrium S() and equip the associated
variables with an , including the exchange rate, xt =
p
At
a
p
Bt
. In this equilibrium the aggregate real
demand for each currency is t e = e at all dates. The central banks would then have to make up for
any dierences between this "target" demand and the demand by private agents. If the two central
bank coordinate to defend the exchange rate13 in a devaluation regime, this is certainly possible. Central
bank c can always meet any demand for currency c. But whenever the price levels are kept at (pAt; p

Bt)
at all dates, the central banks do not have to be active, since aggregate real demand will then be e.
The very credibility of the possible intervention makes intervention unnecesary. It is then when only
one central bank with limited foreign reserves tries to defend an excange rate that currency crises might
appear.
A script for a currency crisis
In the context of our model a natural denition of a currency crisis is a situation where one central
bank intervenes to defend the exchange rate, successfully or not. Consider the case where central bank
A has foreign reserves in the amount of R units of currency B. We assume that this central bank is
committed to intervention whenever called for and, in line with the rational expectations framework
we are working within, that this is known by all agents. Many variations in terms of information and
sequencing of events could be considered, but this is outside the scope of this contribution. We will
merely provide an example, plus two variants, of how a currency crisis could be described in our model
and show that they may appear. In the examples we consider there are three phases. In the pre-crisis
phase the equilibrium values are like in S() and the central bank does not have to intervene. In the
crisis phase the central bank is active on the markets for the two currencies. In the post-crisis phase the
economy is either back at the stationary equilibrium, we could say the intervention was successful, or is
behaving like one of the equilibria we have been studying, a sunspot equilibrium or an equilibrium in
which the economy slowly moves back towards the stationary equilibrium. The main example considers
the case where the central bank is unsuccessful with probability one and where the crisis only lasts one
period. The two variants of this example consider respectively the case where the crisis lasts two periods
and where intervention is successful with positive probability. Since we assume that only central bank
A intervenes, a crisis can only occur in which it is forced to sell some or all of its foreign reserves. We
now turn to describing the equilibrium, ~S() with a currency crisis. Thereafter existence is considered.
The transfers are xed at all dates, SAt =  maxf0; eBt   eAtg, SBt =  maxf0; eAt   eBtg . For
t < T the equilibrium is evolving exactly like in the stationary equilibrium S(). At date T , after the
realization of eAT and eBT the currency crisis occur, but central bank A is able to keep the prices at
13Something that does not seem to be observed in reality.
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pAT and p

BT (and thus the exchange rate at x

T ) by selling all of its reserves. This justies our assuming
that all variables at T   1, in particular AT 1 and BT 1, are the same as in S
(). The support
of the aggregate portfolio at date T + 1 in this equilibrium, ~T+1 = ~AT+1 + ~BT+1, is f^
1; ::::; ^kg.
The probabilities of these aggregate portfolios, known at date T , are ~P = ( ~P 1; : : : ; ~P kg. The portfolio
choices at date T are ~AT and ~BT , with sum ~T , that solve:
maxq
kX
i=1
~P iE
2
4u(q ^ie  SAT+1a
T  
R
a
P 
BT
e
+ (1  q)
(2  ^i)e  SBT+1
a
2  T +
R
a
P 
BT
e
+ ecT+1 + ScT+1)
3
5 (20)
Finally,R = pBT [

T ~T ]e (in particular 

T > ~T ). This means that by selling o all its foreign reserves
the central bank can keep the prices at (pAT ; p

BT): Total demand (including that of central bank A)
for currency A is
pAT ~AT +R
pAT
a
pBT
= pAT ~AT + p

AT [

T   ~T ]e = p

AT

Te
and since supply,MAT+p

ATSAT , is unchanged, p

AT is indeed still the equilibrium price. The equilibrium
on the market for currency B then follows.
We arrive at ( 20 ) as follows. ~pcT = p

cT ; c = A;B and the portfolio holdings, ~cT solve
max
q
E

q
pAT
a
~pAT+1
e+ (1  q)
pBT
a
~pBT+1
e+ ecT+1 + ScT+1

Furthermore, we have that
~MAT+1 = ~T ep

AT = M

AT + p

ATSAT  
pAT
a
pBT
R = epAT  
pAT
a
pBT
R (21)
~MAT+1 = (2  ~T )ep

BT = M

BT + p

BTSBT + R = (2  
)epBT +R (22)
At date T + s, ~cT+s solves
max
q
E

q
~pAT+s
a
~pAT+s+1
e+ (1  q)
~pBT+s
a
~pBT+s+1
e+ ecT+s+1 + ScT+s+1

and we have
~MAT+s+1 = ~T+se~pAT+s = ~MAT+s + ~pAT+sSAT+s (23)
~MBT+s+1 = (2  ~T+s)e~pBT+s = ~MBT+s + ~pBT+sSBT+s (24)
Combining ( 21 ) and ( 23 ) and ( 22 ) and ( 24 ) we arrive at ( 20 ).
(i) For the case where the continuation equilibrium is not aected by extrinsic uncertainty, we simply
have k = 1 and ~T+s+1 = H(~T+s) for s  1.
(ii) For the case where the continuation equilibrium is a sunspot equilibrium, ~cT+s is stochastic,
in f^1; ::::; ^kg with probability 1, and i ~T+s = ^
j there are ~AT+s; ~BT+s with ~AT+s + ~BT+s = ^
j
s.t., for a transition probability fP jig, ~cT+s solves
maxq
kX
i=1
P jiE
"
u(q
^ie  SAT+s+1
a
^j
+ (1  q)
(2  ^i)e  SBT+s+1
a
2  ^j
+ ecT+s+1 + ScT+s+1)
#
Existence of a one-period currency crisis
Refer to the two dimensional indeterminacy described earlier. For case (i) suppose that T  
R
a
P 
BT
e
2
(
a
;
a
). This will be the case if R is suciently small or pBT suciently large. Then let 
1 = T  
R
a
P 
BT
e
.
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For case (ii) suppose that there is some sunspot equilibrium with support f^1; ::::; ^kg s.t.
1 < H(T  
R
a
pBTe
) (25)
k > H(T  
R
a
pBTe
) (26)
Again, this is the case if R is suciently small. Let c(P ) be the solution to ( 20 ). Then for P =
(1; 0; ::; 0), A(P ) + B(P ) < 

T  
R
a
p
BT
e
, while for P = (0; 0; ::; 1), A(P ) + B(P ) > 

T  
R
a
p
BT
e
. There
is thus some ~P s.t. A( ~P ) + B( ~P ) = 

T  
R
a
p
BT
e
. For this ~P the aggregate portfolio of the agents is
such that with the prices pAT and p

BT the reserves of the central bank A are exactly exhausted when it
defends the prices/exchange rate. The fact that a currency crisis may happen at date T does not mean
that it will actually happen. At date T agents have to come to believe that there will be a change of
regime at date T +1 and the occurence of such a self-fullling belief is in itself extrinsic to the economy.
Other types of currency crises
Consider next a two-period crisis. In the rst of the two crisis periods, T and T + 1, the central
bank uses some, but not all of its reserves to, successfully, defend the currency or exchange rate. In
the second period, T + 1, it uses the rest of its reserves but is not able to maintain the prices at pAT+1
and pBT+1, the prices being ~pAT+1 and ~pBT+1 instead. This explains why agents, in period T , are not
choosing the portfolios AT and 

BT and thus why the central bank has to intervene at that date. In
period T + 2 the equilibrium switches to some other continuation equilibrium and the prices in that
equilibrium together with the current prices ~pAT+1 and ~pBT+1 determine, the portfolio choices, ~AT+1
and ~BT+1 with a sum dierent from 1. The details are found in the appendix.
Note in passing, that if the central bank is always able to successfully defend the exchange rate in
two consecutive periods a currency crisis will never appear. For if it successfully defends the attack in
the second of the two periods, the agents will hold the aggregate portfolio T = 1 in the rst period, so
there will be no need to defend in that period. A sucient conditions for the impossibility of currency
attacks at all dates is then R
t
a
p
Bt
> 2e for all t, where Rt is the reserves available at date t (since pBt is
increasing over time, this inequality can only hold for Rt increasing).
Let us return to the one period crisis. If ( 25 ) and ( 26 ) hold, it is possible to construct an
equilibrium where there are positive possibilities, P a and P b respectively, of the following two events:
(a) at T+1 the equilibrium values continues to be the stationary Pareto optimal equilbrium, in particular
the aggregate portfolio continues to be T+1 = 1, (b) the equilibrium values switches to those of the
sunspot equilibrium. So the distribution the agents are using, in making their portfolio choices at
date T is now: Conditional on (a), T+1 = 1 with probability 1 , and conditional on the event (b),
T+1 = ^
i with probability ~P i. Again we can choose suitable P a,P b and ~P such that the reserves of
the central bank are exactly exhausted. In this equilibrium, a currency crisis happens at date T , but
with probability P a the government is successful in keeping the exchange rate at the optimal level and
hence consumption Pareto optimal. Of course, a new currency crisis may then arise at a later date.
4.2.2 Asymmetric Policies
The policies we consider here stipulate that SA  0 (country A is passive), while SB = (eA   eB).
Note that these policies imply that both revaluations and devaluations take place and, what is more
problematic (if we compare with reality), both ination and deation occur in country B. In order to
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achieve C in a stationary equilibrium where the aggregate portfolio is constant we need:
Ae+ (1  A)e 
1  A
a
2  
(eA   eB) + eA = e+
1
a
2
(eA + eB)  C

In other words that
A = 1 
2  
a
2
 A(; ) and B =    1 +
2 
a
2
 B(; ) (=    A) (27)
Then RA   RB =

a
2 
(eA   eB) and since Efu
0(C) a
2 
eA eB
a
e
g = 0 we have an equilibrium for any 
and  2 (0; 2) s.t.
(a) (2  )e   sup(eA   eB) > 0 (b) 1 
2 
a
2
2 (0; 2) (c)    1 +
2  
a
2
2 (0; 2)
When  and  full these requirements we say that they are admissible. Note that for  2 (1=2; 1+ ),
for some positive , the three conditions hold for  in a neighborhood of 1. Note also, that if  = 1,
SA + eA = eA = eB + (eA   eB) = eB + SB, i.e. that ( 6 ) holds, so that sunspots can have no real
eects.
We have, for given  , that @Aa
@
+ @Ba
@
= 1. The dynamical system thus has a large degree of nominal
indeterminacy. In other words, for a given policy,  , in the family considered, there are many stationary
equilibria, each with dierent aggregate portfolios of the two currencies, but all of them achieving the
consumption C. A counterpart to this observation is that the eigenvalues of the matrix associated with
the dynamical system (dened is terms of A and B as in the analysis above) are 0 and 1. This means
that we cannot apply Theorem 3 of CG&G, since they explicitly rule out that any eigenvalue is equal
to 1 and require that some is greater than 1.
We show, for any admissible pair (; ), that there is a random variable (; ) and an (; ) 2 <
such that if ^A(; ) = A(; )+(; ), ^B(; ) = B(; ) (; ), and 
0
(; ) = + (; ), then
(i) With probability 1 (; 
0
(; )) is admissible
(ii) For any random (
0
A; 
0
B) s.t., with probability 1, 
0
A + 
0
B = 
0
(; ) and 
0
c 2 [0; 1]; c = A;B
(^A(; );^B(; );
0
A; 
0
B) form a temporary equilibrium (suppressing reference to policies and informa-
tion) .
For given  we can then construct a sunspot equilibrium as follows. Choose 1 such that (; 1) is
admissible and 1A = A(; 1), and 1B = B(; 1). Then choose 2 = 
0
(; 1) and with probability
one, (; 2) is admissible and (1A; 1B, ^A(; 2), ^B(; 2)) form a temporary equilibrium. Then for
any realization of 2 we let 3 = 
0
(; 2) = 2 + (; 2) and continuing like this we get a sunspot
equilibrium.
Perturbations that are permissible and form temporary equilibria
So let (; ) be admissible. Let A = 1 
2 
a
2 +, 

B =  1+
2 
a
2   and 
0
= +, where  2 f1; 2g.
For a given realization, i the resulting consumptions are
CAi = C
 +

1
a

+
1
a
2  

ei+
1  1a

a

ei + 
eA   eB
a
2  
where we have used that
A(;)
a

 
1 A(;)
a
2 
=
1  1a

a

and CBi = 2C
   CAi. Finally, with the perturbed
gross returns s.t. RA() RB() = (
1
a

+ 1a
2 
)e+  eA eBa
2 
and letting the probability of i be Pi we get
the system: FA(1; 2; ) =
2X
i=1
E
"
u
0
 
C
 +

1
a

+
1
a
2  

ei+
1  1a
a

ei + 
eA   eB
a
2  
!
(
1
a

+
1
a
2  
)e+ 
eA   eB
a
2  
#
Pi
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and FB(1; 2; ) =
2X
i=1
E
" 
C

 

1
a

+
1
a
2  

ei  
1  1a

a

ei   
eA   eB
a
2  
!
(
1
a

+
1
a
2  
)e + 
eA   eB
a
2  
#
Pi
We have FA(0; 0; 0) = FB(0; 0; 0) = 0 and taking derivatives w.r.t. i and  and evaluating in (0; 0; 0)
we get:
@FA
a
@i
=
@FB
a
@i
= Eu0(C)

1
a

+
1
a
2  

ePi > 0 and
@FA
a
@
=  
@FB
a
@
= Eu00(C)


a
2  
2
(eA   eB)
2
< 0, implying that
det
 
@FA
a
@1
@FA
a
@
@FB
a
@1
@FB
a
@
!
=  2
@FA
a
@1
@FA
a
@
> 0
So the implicit function theorem applies: We have implicitly dened 1 and  as functions of 2 in a
neighborhood of (0; 0; 0). By making 2 suciently small we can guarantee that (; + ) is admissible
with probability one. Note that, in general, CAi is not independent of i; sunspots have real eects. It is
actually the case that @a
@2
= 0 for the implicit function, but one can also show that in a neighborhood
of (0; 0; 0) if, in equilibrium, 2 is dierent from 0 so is .
CONCLUSION: DEVALUATIONS
We considered two types of devaluation policies, symmetric and asymmetric. For the rst case we
studied a continuum of policies that bear some resemblance to the devaluations policies seen, at least
historically. According to these policies the government of the country that experiences a relatively
negative shock pursues an expansionary monetary policy, i.e. issues money and transfers this money to
the consumers, (or, in another interpretation, buys the commodity for the money and hands it over to
the (old) consumers). As a consequence the currency of this country devaluates, something that causes
all who holds this currency (including foreigners) to experience a negative net return. The end result
is, in equilibrium, a net transfer from foreigners to the home country. It was shown that for most of
these policies sunspots may have real eects, i.e. there are sunspot equilibria where the exchange rate
as well as the consumption of agents uctuate in response to the sunspot. The exception was the unique
policy that makes the representative agents (two countries) ex-ante identical. Finally, we asked whether
interventions by one or both central banks can prevent the countries from sliding into a suboptimal
sunspot equilibrium. If the two central banks coordinate, the Pareto optimal allocation can indeed
be defended, but if only one central bank defends the exchange rate this may not be possible. The
conclusions for the asymmetric case are quite similar to those reached for the symmetric case. Only for
one out of a continuum of policies can sunspots not have any real eects. It is obviously the case, also
for this family of policies, that coordinated central bank intervention can make the exchange rate move
in the desired way, while if only one central bank intervenes this may not prevent the allocation from
being eventually suboptimal.
4.3 Policies for a Constant Exchange Rate
Let us rst show that for each member of the family of xed exchange rate policies there is an equilibrium,
where C is achieved. We already, in the previous section, showed that if At = Bt = q=2;8t, C

is achieved. It is then clear that (iii) of Denition 2 is fullled. More generally, for  2 (0; 2) if
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A = B =
1
a
2


CA = CB = C
 and the rst order condition holds:
E
2
4u0(Ct+1)
0
@e   qa2(q 1)(eBt+1   eAt+1)

 
(2  )e  2 qa
2(q 1)
(eBt+1   eAt+1)
a
2  
1
A
3
5 =
E
"
u
0(Ct+1)
 
2 q
a
2   
q
a

2(q   1)
eBt+1   eAt+1
e
!#
= 0
On the other hand, the restrictions on q are chosen such that for  close to q if At = Bt =
1
a
2


; 8t
(i) (ii) of the denition holds. This establishes the counterpart to the Kareken and Wallace (1981)
indeterminacy result. For Policy 2 there is a continuum of equilibria all with dierent exchange rates
(to be studied shortly). We already observed, that with the family of policies considered, sunspots
cannot have any real eects. In the following, we show that sunspots may have nominal eects. We also
note that if both of the central banks of the two countries stand by the exchange rate, these nominal
eects do not appear.
Since, with the family of policies considered here, the agents are identical, the equilibrium conditions
of Denition 2 boil down to:
Et

u
0(Ct+1)

t+1e
a
t
 
2  t+1
a
2  t

= 0; 8t (28)
t+1e 
q
a
2(q   1)
et+1 > 0; 8t; a.s. (29)
(2  t+1)e 
2  q
a
2(q   1)
et+1 > 0; 8t; a.s. (30)
To get ( 28 ) we used thatEt[u
0(Ct+1)(
q=te
a
2(q 1)
et+1)] = 0 and similarly,Et[u
0(Ct+1)(
(2 q)=(2 t)e
a
2(q 1)
et+1)] =
0, while ( 29 ) and ( 30 ) are simply restatements of (ii) of Denition 2. ( 28 ) is equivalent to:
Et

u
0(Ct+1)t+1

= Et

u
0(Ct+1)t

(31)
If ftg is a martingale independent of feAt; eBtg, ( 31 ) holds. If, furthermore a.s.

d

q
a
2(q   1)
supe
a
e
< t < 2 
2  q
a
2(q   1)
supe
a
e
 
u
; 8t
then ( 29 ) and ( 30 ) also hold and we have an equilibrium, where (if ftg is truely random) the
exchange rate will uctuate in response to a sunspot, but where real variables are left unaected. Note,
that in this case, since ftg is then a bounded martingale, by the martingale convergence theorem, it
converges a.s. to some stochastic variable
a
. Let us briey look at the implications for the exchange
rate.
The exchange rate in the long run
Write the exchange rate at date s, xs, as: xs = x1
s 1Y
t=1
xt+1
a
xt
; i.e. logxs = log xa+
s 1X
t=1
log
xt+1
a
xt
where
xt+1
a
xt
=
pAt+1=pBt+1
a
pAt=pBt
=
[2  t+1]e 
2 q
a
2(q 1)
et
a
[2  t]e

"
t+1e 
q
a
2(q 1)
et
a
te
#
 1
:
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Suppose that t = 

; 8t. Then using the independence of fetg and the strong law of large numbers
we have
1
a
s  1
s 1X
t=1
log
2(q   1)e  2 qa
2 et+1
a
2(q   1)e  qa

et+1
! E
"
log
2(q   1)e  2 qa
2 e
a
2(q   1)e  qa

e
#
a.s.
This means that if E

log
2(q 1)e 
2 q
a
2 
e
a
2(q 1)e 
q
a

e

< 0(> 0) then logxs !  1(1) i.e. xs ! 0(1). Letting P
be the distribution of e we have
E
"
log
2(q   1)e  2 qa
2 
e
a
2(q   1)e  qae
#
=
Z
1
0
"
log
2(q   1)e  2 qa
2 
y
a
2(q   1)e  qa y
+ log
2(q   1)e+ 2 qa
2 
y
a
2(q   1)e+ qa y
#
P (dy) =
Z
1
0
log
4(q   1)2e2  

2 q
a
2 
2
y
2
a
4(q   1)2e2  
  q
a

2
y2
P (dy)
For  = q this expression is 0. Furthermore, for any y the integrand is decreasing in . Consequently,
for  < q the expectations is > 0 implying that xs ! 1 a.s. and for 

> q it is < 0, implying that
xs ! 0 a.s.. This is as we should expect: If there is less demand for currency A (and thus more for
currency B) there is greater ination in country A and currency A depreciates against currency B. In
any of the two cases there is a serious ination dierence between the two countries. Since ftg and
fetg are independent, the conclusion we found for constant t implies that if t !
a
 < q(> q) then
xt !1(0). If ftg is a martingale, in general, a.s. either of the two will happen.
In the appendix it is shown by means of an example that such an extreme behavior may not be
present in a sunspot equilibrium, i.e. xt may uctuate without ever tending to either 0 or 1. Both
types of sunspot equilibria may be thought of as depicting repeated speculative attacks on one or both
of the two currencies. These attacks are rational in the sense that agents have correct expectations
of what is going to happen in the future. The result could be, as we saw, that one of the currencies
becomes almost valueless. For reasons strictly outside the model considered here this may not be deemed
desirable. Our model is also too simple to capture the direct eects of wild uctuations in the exchange
rate14, for instance on investments in export businesses. At any rate, if the two central banks are truely
committed to a xed exchange rate, no speculative attacks can eect this rate. It is only when a single
centralbank is called to defend its own currency by selling its (limited) reserves that the xed exchange
rate arrangement may break down. We will briey expose how this works in the present model. But rst
let us remark that not only the fear of speculative attacks may prompt the central banks to coordinate.
When the exchange rate is xed, agents are indierent between any portfolio of currencies (this is what
makes a xed rate regime very vulnerable to attacks). However, for the exchange rate to stay xed, the
aggregate investment in currency A , e has to be exactly equal to qe i.e. the agents have to coordinate,
a questionable assumption in conjunction with the assumption that there are many small agents in the
economy. When central banks coordinate, the individual agents need not do so.
Let fAt; 

Bt; C

t ; C

t ;
q
a
2(q 1)
et;
2 q
a
2(q 1)
et;M

At;M

Bt; p

At; p

Btgt be any Policy 2 equilibrium, where


At + 

Bt = q; 8t and the exchange rate is xed, xt =
pAt
a
pBt
=
a
x; 8t. Any sequence f^At; ^bt; C

t ; C

t ;
q
a
2(q 1)
et;
2 q
a
2(q 1)
et; M^At; M^Bt; pAt; pBtgt where
M^At = pAt(^At + ^Bt)e and M^Bt = pBt(2  ^At   ^Bt)e
is then an equilibrium where the two central banks coordinate by always oering their own currency at
the rate
a
x. In this equilibrium, at any date t, M^At+1 of currency A is demanded while M^At + SAt is
14Although, in the companion paper, Nielsen(1988) one possible consequence, that agents beliefs become more incorrect
is considered.
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supplied from private agents and the government in country A. If M^At+1 > M^At + SAt the dierence
is made up by central bank A buying RAt in foreign reserves, where
pAt
a
pBt
RAt = M^At+1   M^At + SAt.
If supply is bigger than demand M^At+1 < M^At + SAt then central bank B buys currency A to make up
for the dierence. The result will be a build-up of reserves over time in each central bank (unless they
exchange them along the way).
Some Further Remarks
Clearly, if only one of the two central banks, say A, tries to defend the exchange rate, with limited
foreign reserves it will most likely be unsuccesful. If M^At > M^At + PAtSAt + ,  > 0 for suciently
many periods, which due to the agents' indierence between all portfolios under a xed exchange rate
can certainly happen, its reserves will be exhausted. A transition to a regime where the exchange rate
is oating (but the consumption is still Ct ) may then take place in the same way as described for the
case of Policy 1s.
The counterpart to Policy 1a is the case where SAt  0. If C
 is achieved it follows from ( 6 ) and
( 7 ) that SBt = eAt   eBt and t = t 1 + (1  t 1)
eAt eBt
a
2e + (2  t 1)
eBt eAt
a
2e = t 1  
eAt eBt
a
2e and
then clearly, ftg cannot be bounded with probability one so no equilibrium exists. Both countries need
to be active in order for C to be achieved with a constant exchange rate.
CONCLUSION: FIXED EXCHANGE RATES
Under policy 2 there is an equilibrium where the exchange rate is constant. However, there are also
equilibria where the exchange rate reacts to non-fundamental shocks. Such sun-spot equilibria can be
interpreted as regimes with repeated currency attacks. The real parts of all these equilibria are the
same, namely the Pareto optimal allocation, (C; C). This should be contrasted with Obstfeld and
Rogo(2000) who found the optimal x to be Pareto dominated by the optimal oat15. The result
on Pareto optimality, also for the sunspot equilibria, relies heavily on the assumption that agents hold
rational expectations and the ex-ante symmetry between agents brought about by the policy. If the
governments want to avoid exchange rate volatility they could do so by making their central banks
coordinate to defend the xed exchage rate. If on the other hand only one central bank intervenes it is
doomed to fail under repeated currency attacks.
4.4 Monetary Union
In a monetary union there is only one currency and the exchange rate cannot provide for insurance.
In our simple world the only alternative is, that governments agree to make direct transfers across
borders. Consider transfer policy 1s, with  = 1. This policy would be funded by a seignorage tax on
the commonly held currency.
For this regime there is (for a given initial money supply) a unique monetary equilibrium. The
problem of the young agents is trivial, they invest all their real wealth in the single currency. So
Mt+1 = 2ePt = Mt + Pt(SAt + SBt) = Mt + Pt(maxfeBt   eAt; eAt   eBtg)
The resulting consumption is, for agent A: CAt =
1
a
2
Mt
a
Pt
+ eAt + SAt =
1
a
2
[2e  (SAt + SBt)] + eAt + SAt =
e+ eAt +maxf0; eBt  eAtg 
1
a
2
maxfeBt   eAt; eAt   eBtg = C

t . The interpretation is straight forward
and in line with some arguments concerning the attractiveness of a monetary union. Only with a
coordinated scal policy in place, according to which a country (or region) hit adversely by a shock
is subsidized by the rest of the countries in the monetary union can a monetary union achieve Pareto
optimality. If such a coordinated scal policy is in place, then the members of the union will reap the
15Our conclusion is almost the opposite, since most devaluation policies are expectationally unstable.
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benets of the absence of any extrinsic uncertainty aecting their economic interaction. On the other
hand, if a coordinated scal policy can only be partially instituted, there is a real trade-o between,
say, a devaluation policy and a monetary union.
5 Conclusion
The analysis presented here is focused on the possible role of expectation in the markets for foreign
exchange. The model employed for this analysis allows us to provide a rationale for several exchange
rate regimes some of which have rather straight forward interpretations in terms of what has, historically,
been observed16. These government policies are neccessary remedies to make up for the lack of complete
markets. What is demonstrated, within the context of the model, is that the possibility of sunspot
equilibria should be taken into account when the choice of exchange rate regime is made. Our general
conclusion for the model was that letting the exchange rate oat without any government intervention
will only achieve a Pareto optimal allocation for a limited time. If the governments pursue a coordinated
devaluation policy a Pareto optimal allocation may be achieved, however for most of these polices there
are many equilibria for which the exchange rate varies more than called for by fundamentals and which
result in suboptimal consumptions. In the case of a policy aimed at keeping the exchange rate xed,
sunspots cannot aect fundamentels in our model, but may eect nominal variables. However, we
pointed out that if central banks choose to cooperate a xed exchange rate can be defended. Currency
crises are always only possible if there is a lack of cooperation between monetary authorities.
Throughout the paper we assumed that agents have rational expectations. This is not a realistic
assumption as argued in the companion paper (see also for instance Elliott and Ito, 1999 and Tay-
lor,1995). There are also reasons to question whether it is an innocuous assumption: diversity of beliefs
and in particular mistaken beliefs may have a considerable impact on the performance of the exchange
rate markets . Seen in this light, the results of this paper can be seen as "lower bounds" on the dier-
ences between dierent regimes. If there is expectational instability under rational expectations there
will certainly also be so under rational beliefs. In the companion paper where we assume that agents
have, not rational expectations, but rational (and diverse) beliefs we consider all policies within a large
family and including all policies considered here. We then show that only xed exchange rates with
central bank coordination or a monetary union with scal coordination will achieve C. In particular,
the single devaluation policy, identied to achieve C under rational expectations, does not pass the
test when we allow for diverse beliefs. The results in the companion paper could then be considered
as "upper bounds" on to what degree we can distinguish between dierent exchange rate regimes. To
judge whether the reality is closer to the upper bound one would then have to empirically assess, how
important are the welfare losses that result from mistaken beliefs about the exchange rates.
Models like Obstfeld and Rogo(2000) are specied to take into account the possible "insurance" role
of exible exchange rates in adjusting the terms of trade in reaction to asymmetric shocks17, (something
that is also allowed for in the current analysis, albeit in a much simpler and probably less realistic way).
On the other hand the scope for expectational instability seems more limited in such models and in that
sense the stakes are against a regime with xed exchange rates. The model considered here assumes
perfect substitutability between currencies, so the stakes are against a regime with oating exchange
16Not all combinations being studied can be argued to have real world counterparts. Thus one probably seldom sees
full central bank coordination and maybe not even uncoordinated intervention under a devaluation policy - although this
depends on whether we should think of, for instance, managed oats and pegs with infrequent realignments as being
described by policy 1s or 1a .
17Devereux and Engel(2000) question this role.
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rates. There seems still to be some way to go before arriving at a general equilibrium model where
active policies are called for and which is more open to both aspects of the foreign exchange markets.
Appendix
1 No Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved with non-intervention
Any individually rational Pareto optimal allocation for date t, (C^At; C^Bt) has the form ((C

t )2C

t ; (1 
(Ct )2C

t ), a.s., where  is a function dened on <+, and fulls for some  2 (0; 1)
u0[(Ct )C

t ] = (1  )u
0[(1  (Ct ))C

t ] a.s.
When  = 1=2,   1=2, and if  > 1=2 then (Ct ) > 1=2;8C

t . Following the same procedure as in
the main text, we ask what RAt and RBt must be for (C^At; C^Bt) to be achieved. We require
[At 1RAt + (1  At 1)RBt]e+ eAt = (C

t )2C

t
[Bt 1RAt + (1  Bt 1)RBt]e+ eBt = (1  (C

t ))2C

t
It easy to see, that At 1 = Bt 1 is not possible if these equations hold. They can then be solved to
give: RAt =
(1  Bt 1)(C

t )  (1  At 1)(1  (C

t ))
At 1   Bt 1
2 +
2  (At 1 + Bt 1)
a
At 1   Bt 1
[(Ct )eBt   (1  (C

t ))eAt]
1
a
e
and RBt =
At 1(1  (C

t ))  Bt 1(C

t )
a
At 1   Bt 1
2 
At 1 + Bt 1
a
At 1   Bt 1
[(Ct )eBt   (1  (C

t ))eAt]
1
a
e
so that
RAt   RBt =
2
a
At 1   Bt 1
[2(Ct )  1 + ((C

t )eBt   (1  (C

t ))eAt)
1
a
e
]
But then, if (Ct ) > (<) 1=2 a.s.
2
a
At 1   Bt 1
Efu0(C^ct)
2
a
At   Bt
[2(Ct )  1 + ((C

t )eBt   (1  (C

t ))eAt)
1
a
e
]g > (<) 0; c = A;B
so the rst order conditions of the two agents, required for equilibrium, cannot hold.
2 Perpetual eects of sunspot under non-intervention
Let ftgt be a martingale s.t. t 2 (0; 2); 8t, a.s.. Furthermore, ftg is picked such that for all t
and all t there are
a
(t) > t > a(t) such that P (t+1 =
a
(t)jt) = P (t+1 = a(t)jt) = 1=2.
Finally, assume that this martingale is independent of feAt; eBtgt. Let for given t, RAt and RBt be the
corresponding gross returns and dene
a
Rt =
a
(t)
a
t
 
2 
a
(t)
a
2 t
and 
a
Rt =

a
(t)
t
 
2 
a
(t)
a
2 t
=  
a
Rt. So
RAt   RBt 2 f
a
Rt;aRtg. We then have that
E

u0(e+ ect+1)(RAt+1   RBt+1)jt

= 0; c = A;B
and letting ct = t=2; 8t we have an equilibrium.
Next we consider the following perturbations of the distribution of t+1 given t. For ease of notation
we suppress reference to t, taken to be given below. Let ~e be chosen such that P (eAt = ~e) = 0 and
P (eAt < ~e) 2 (0; 1). Then dene the perturbed distribution as follows:
P (t+1 =
a
jeAt+1 > ~e; eBt+1 > ~e) = P
(t+1 =
a
jeAt+1 < ~e; eBt+1 < ~e) =
1
a
2
P (t+1 =
a
jeAt+1 > ~e; eBt+1 < ~e) =
1
a
2
  
P (t+1 =
a
jeAt+1 < ~e; eBt+1 > ~e) =
1
a
2
+ 
24
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO nº 0102
This perturbation makes t and (eAt; eBt) dependent, but leaves the marginal distribution of t un-
changed. We show that with this new distribution there is a  > 0 and a new equilibrium, where the
optimal portfolios are ^At = t=2 +  and ^Bt = t=2   . E
 now refers to expectation under the
perturbed distribution.
E

u0(e+ eAt+1)(RAt+1   RBt+1)jt

=
E

u0(e+ eAt+1)(RAt+1  RBt+1)jt; (eAt+1; eBt+1) > (~e; ~e) _ (eAt+1; eBt+1) < (~e; ~e)


P ((eAt+1; eBt+1) > (~e; ~e) _ (eAt+1; eBt+1) < (~e; ~e))
+
Z
1
~e
Z ~e
0
u0(e+ eAt+1)P (deAt+1)

P (deBt+1)[
a
Rt(
1
a
2
+ ) + 
a
Rt(
1
a
2
  )]
+
Z ~e
0
Z
1
~e
u0(e+ eAt+1)P (deAt+1)

P (deBt+1)[
a
Rt(
1
a
2
  ) + 
a
Rt(
1
a
2
+ )]
The rst element of this sum is equal to 0, while the second and third are equal to
Z
1
~e
Z ~e
0
u0(e+ eAt+1)dP (eAt+1)

P (deBt+1)
 
Z ~e
0
Z
1
~e
u0(e+ eAt+1)dP (eAt+1)

P (deBt+1)

[
a
Rt  aRt] (32)
Since, by the strict concavity of u, u0(eA) < u
0(eB) for eA 2 (~e;1); eB 2 (0; ~e) we have
Z ~e
0
Z
1
~e
u0(e+ eAt+1)P (deAt+1)

P (deBt+1) <
Z ~e
0
Z
1
~e
u0(e+ eBt+1)P (deAt+1)

P (deBt+1) =Z
1
~e
Z ~e
0
u0(e+ eBt+1)P (deBt+1)

P (deAt+1) =
Z
1
~e
Z ~e
0
u0(e+ eAt+1)P (deAt+1)

P (deBt+1)
Consequently, ( 32 ) is positive. This means that agent A wants to invest more in currency A under
the perturbed distribution. I.e. there is  > 0 such that under the perturbed distribution the optimal
portfolio is ^At = t=2+. We now only have to show that under the perturbed distribution the optimal
portfolio for B is ^Bt = t=2  , i.e. that
E[u0(e  (RAt+1   RBt+1) + eBt+1)(RAt+1  RBt+1)jt] = 0
For any e^ then, u0(e+ 
a
Rt+1 + e^)
a
Rt+1 =  u
0(e  
a
Rt+1 + e^)aRt+1
from which one can show that
E[u0(e  (RAt+1  RBt+1) + eBt+1)(RAt+1  RBt+1)jt] =
 E[u0(e+ (RAt+1  RBt+1) + eBt+1)(RAt+1  RBt+1)jt] = 0
For instance, E[u0(e+
a
Rt+1+eAt+1)
a
Rt+1jt; eAt+1 > ~e; eBt+1 < ~e](
1
a
2
 )P (eAt+1 > e^; eBt+1 < e^) =
 E[u0(e  
a
Rt+1 + eBt+1)aRt+1jt; eAt+1 < ~e; eBt+1 > ~e](
1
a
2
  )P (eAt+1 < e^; eBt+1 > e^)
and so on. This completes the example. Note, that when the distribution is unperturbated, there is
autarky. Since, each agent c, c = A;B can also under the perturbed distribution choose the portfolio
=2, resulting in the consumption e + ect, but does not, the consumption in the sunspot equilibrium
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strictly Pareto dominates e+ ect. Finally, note that the inuence of the sunspot will decrease over time,
since the martingale process ftg, being bounded, converges.
3 A two-period currency crisis
The crisis starts in period T . Before then, the equilibrium values, identied by a~, are equal to those
prevailing in the stationary Pareto optimal equilibrium with no extrinsic uncertainty, identied by an *.
During the crisis the central bank in country A uses up all its reserves. From period T +2 and onwards
the equilibrium values are like in a sunspot equilibrium. In period T we then have:
~MAT+1 = ~TeP

AT = M

AT + P

ATSAT  
P AT
a
P BT
RT = 

TeP

AT  
P AT
a
P BT
RT
~MBT+1 = (2  ~T )eP

BT = M

BT + P

BTSBT +RT = (2  

T )eP

BT +RT
where Rt is the amount of reserves that central bank A supplies to the market in period t = T; T + 1.
Furthermore, ~cT solves for c = A;B:
max
q2[0;1]
E
(
u
"
q
P AT
a
~PAT+1
e+ (1  q)
P BT
a
~PBT+1
e+ ecT+1 + ScT+1
#)
In period T + 1 we have
~MAT+2 = ~T+1e ~PAT+1 = ~MAT+1 + ~PAT+1SAT+1  
~PAT+1
a
~PBT+1
RT+1
~MBT+2 = (2  ~T+1)e ~PBT+1 = ~MBT+1 + ~PBT+1SBT+1+ RT+1
and ~cT+2 solves, for c = A;B,
max
q2[0;1]
E
(
u
"
q
~PAT+1
a
~PAT+2
e+ (1  q)
~PBT+1
a
~PBT+2
e+ ecT+2 + ScT+2
#)
From T + 2 and onwards the usual equilibrium conditions apply.
We can then, in the usual way, rewrite the equilibrium returns as follows:
P AT
a
~PAT+1
e =
~T+1e  SAT+1 +
RT+1
a
~PBT+1
T  
RT
a
P 
BT
e
and
P BT
a
~PBT+1
e =
(2  ~T+1)e  SBT+1  
RT+1
a
~PBT+1
2  T +
RT
a
P 
BT
e
Then using that RT+1 = R RT and that ~MBT+2 = ~MBT+1 + ~PBT+1SBT+1+RT+1 = M

BT+P

BTSBT+
RT + ~PBT+1SBT+1 +RT+1 = M

BT+1 + R +
~PBT+1SBT+1 so that (2  ~T+1)e ~PBT+1 = M

BT+1 + R +
~PBT+1SBT+1, i.e.
~PBT+1 =
MBT+1 +R
a
(2  ~T+1)e  SBT+1
we get a description of the relevant part of the equlibrium as follows.
~AT ; ~BT ; ~AT+1; ~BT+1; ~RT ; (^
1; : : : ; ^k); ( ~P 1; : : : ; ~P k) such that
(1) ~RT < R
(2) ~AT + ~BT = 

T  
~RT
a
P 
BT
e
2 (0; 2)
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(3) ~cT = ~cT ( ~RT ; ~T+1) where ~cT (RT ; 
0
) solves:
max
q2[0;1]
E
8><
>:u
2
64q 
0
e  SAT+1 + (R  RT )
(2 
0
)e SBT+1
a
M
BT+1
+R
T  
RT
a
P 
BT
e
+
(1  q)
(2  
0
)e  SBT+1   (R RT )
(2 
0
)e SBT+1
a
M
BT+1
+R
(2  T ) +
RT
a
P 
BT
e
+ ecT+1 + ScT+1
3
75
9>=
>;
(4) ~cT+1 = ~cT+1(f ~P
i
g; ~T+1) where for any probability vector, P
i and 
0
2 (0; 2), ~cT+1(fP
i
g; 
0
)
solves
max
q2[0;1]
kX
i=1
E
(
u
"
q
^ie  SAT+2
a

0
+ (1  q)
(2  ^i)e  SBT+2
a
2  
0
+ ecT+2 + ScT+2
#)
P i
and where there are for i = 1; 2; ::; k ^iA and ^
i
B summing to ^
i where ^ic solves
maxq
kX
j=1
E
(
u
"
q
^je  SA
a
^i
+ (1  q)
(2  ^j)e  SB
a
2  ^j
+ ec + Sc
#)
P ji (33)
for some transition matrix [P ij ].
(5) Finally, we need that both ~T+1 and the ^
i's fulll the feasibility requirements that e   SA > 0
and (2  )e  SB > 0, something which holds in a neigborhood of 

t  1.
We use the characterization of a two dimensional indeterminacy provided in 4.2.1 . Suppose then that
(a) T  
R
a
P 
BT
2 (
a
;
a
)
(b) There is some sunspot equilibrium [P ji], (^1; : : : ; ^k) (i.e. ( 33 ) holds) such that ^1 < H(T 
R
a
P 
BT
) <
^k.
These two requirements hold if Ra
P 
BT
is suciently small. Starting by setting RT = R we get a one
period currency crisis, with ~T+1 = H(

T  
R
a
P 
BT
), ~T+2 = H(~T+1) = H(H(

T  
R
a
P 
BT
)) and so
on. Since @~cTa
@
0 > 0 (for RT close to R), for RT in a neighborhood of R there is 
0
(RT) such that
~AT (RT ; 
0
(RT ))+~BT(RT ; 
0
(RT )) = 

T  
RT
a
P 
BT
e
. When RT is suciently close to R, 
0
(RT ) 2 (^
1; ^k)
continues to hold so there is some ( ~P 1; : : : ; ~P k) such that
~AT+1(f ~P
i
g; 
0
(RT )) + ~BT+1(f ~P
i
g; 
0
(RT )) = 
0
(RT)
This concludes the proof. The two-period currency crisis depicted here is "close" to a one-period currency
crisis. One would expect that there would also be two-period currency crises where the government would
spend substantial amounts of reserves in the second period.
4 Perpetual eects of sunspots under Policy 2
As previously stated the equilibrium conditions are
Et

u0(Ct+1)t+1

= E

u0(Ct+1)

t
together with the boundary conditions on t. Let t+1 = t + t+1, where t+1 is random, and the
requirement is
Et

u0(Ct+1)t+1

= 0
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Find e^ such that (eA + eB > e^) 2 (0; 1) and (eA + eB = e^) = 0 . We then have E[u
0(e+ (C)=2)jeA +
eB < e^] > E[u
0(e+ (C)=2)jeA + eB > e^]. We now dene three distributions for . Let a
u =  1 and
a

u
=
R e^
0 u
0(C)=2)P (d(eA + eB))R
1
e^ u
0(e+ (C)=2)P (d(eA + eB))
where P is the distribution of eAt + eBt. Then for each t dene two random variables, 
u
t and 
d
t , as
follows:
if eAt + eBt > e^; 
u
t =
a

u
a
maxf
a

u
; 1g
else, ut =

a
u
a
maxf
a

u
; 1g
and let dt =  
u
t . Both are assumed to be independent of all variables but eAt + eBt.
We then haveE[u0(Ct )
u
t )] = E[u
0(Ct )
u
t jeAt+eBt > e^]P (eAt+eBt >e^)+E[u
0(Ct )
u
t jeAt+eBt <e^]P (eAt+
eBt < e^) =
R
e^
0
u0(C
t
)P (d(eAt+eBt))R
1
e^
u0(C
t
)P (d(eAt+eBt))
R
1
e^ u
0(Ct )P (d(eAt + eBt))  
R e^
0 u
0(Ct )P (d(eAt + eBt)) = 0. Conse-
quently, E[u0(Ct )
d
t )] = 0, also.
Furthermore,
Eut =  P (eAt + eBt < e^) + P (eAt + eBt > e^)
R e^
0 u
0(Ct )P (d(eAt + eBt))
aR
1
e^ u
0(Ct )P (d(eAt + eBt))
=
 P (eAt + eBt < e^) + P (eAt + eBt < e^)
R e^
0 u
0(Ct )P (d(eAt + eBt))=P (eAt + eBt < e^)
aR
1
e^ u
0(Ct )P (d(eAt + eBt))=P (eAt + eBt > e^)
= P (eAt + eBt < e^)

 1 +
E[u0(Ct )jeAt + eBt < e^]
a
E[u0(Ct )jeAt + eBt > e^]

> 0
Then Ed < 0: Finally, let n(t) =  1 with probability 1=2 and 
n(t) = 1 with probability 1=2,
independently of eAt + eBt and let  > 0. Let 0 < xa < x
 <
a
x, where x is the constant equilibrium
exchange rate. Then dene ftgt as follows. 1 = q and 2 = 1 + 
n
2minfjt   
d
j; jt  
u
g=(1 + )
if x
a
< xt <
a
x let t+1 = t + 
nminfjt   
d
j; jt  
u
g=(1 + )
if xt  xa let t+1 = t + 
dminfjt   
d
j; jt   
u
g=(1 + ) if t  q; t+1 = t; else
if xt 
a
x let t+1 = t + 
uminfjt   
d
j; jt   
u
g=(1 + ) if t < q; t+1 = t; else :
This process has the desired properties: xt neither tends to 0 nor to1. The idea of the construction is
as follows. As long as, say, xt  xa, we try to make fxsg increase by making  decrease if t  q, since
we know that if t < q then fxsg (informally speaking) will (tend to) increase. The desired decrease is
brought about by adding d, which has a negative expected value to t. As soon as t < q we do not
need to change it since the increase in fxsg then takes place. As fxsg increases it eventually crosses
into being > x
a
and the process is now governed by one of the other two cases.
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